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Abstract—The problem in which one of three pairwise inter-
acting parties is required to securely compute a function of the
inputs held by the other two, when one party may arbitrarily
deviate from the computation protocol (active behavioral model),
is studied. An information-theoretic characterization of uncondi-
tionally secure computation protocols under the active behavioral
model is provided. A protocol for Hamming distance computation
is provided and shown to be unconditionally secure under both
active and passive behavioral models using the information-
theoretic characterization. The difference between the notions
of security under the active and passive behavioral models is
illustrated through the BGW protocol for computing quadratic
and Hamming distances; this protocol is secure under the passive
model, but is shown to be not secure under the active model.
I. INTRODUCTION
The subject of secure multiparty computation (SMC) is
concerned with the design and analysis of distributed protocols
that allow a mutually untrusting group to securely compute
functions of their private inputs while not revealing any
more information than must be inherently revealed by the
computation itself. In this broad domain (see [1] for a detailed
overview) one can consider computational or unconditional
(information-theoretic) definitions of security, active or passive
behavioral models, and the utilization of additional communi-
cation primitives, e.g., shared randomness via multi-terminal
sources and/or channels. In this paper, we study secure com-
putation involving three parties that can communicate via
pairwise authenticated and error-free bitpipes where one party
is required to compute a function of the inputs held by the
other two. Our focus is on unconditional security and an active
behavioral model in which one party may arbitrarily deviate
from the computation protocol.
The scenario of three-party computation with one actively
deviating party is interesting since no security guarantees
are available in this scenario for the general SMC protocols
of [2], [3]. For the active behavioral model and only pairwise
communication, the protocols of [2], [3] are secure only if
strictly less than a third of the parties are compromised. Thus,
nontrivial security guarantees are only available for a mini-
mum of four parties. On the other hand certain computations,
such as Byzantine agreement [4], are provably impossible
in a three-party setting while other non-trivial computations
are possible. A characterization of all functions that can be
securely computed in a three-party setting with one actively
deviating party is currently unavailable.
The formulation of security in the active behavioral model
requires careful consideration of the notions of correctness
and privacy since a party may arbitrarily deviate from the
protocol. A deviating party can always affect the integrity
of the computation by simply changing its input data. This,
however, should not be considered a security weakness since
such an attack could also be mounted against a “trusted genie”
who can receive all inputs, perform all computations, and
deliver the results to the designated parties. A deviating party’s
ability to influence the computation or affect the privacy
should, ideally, not exceed what could be done against such
a trusted genie. Therefore, in the active behavioral model, a
protocol is said to be secure if it adequately simulates a trusted
genie that facilitates the computation. This is formalized by
the real versus ideal model simulation paradigm for SMC [5].
The passive behavioral model, in contrast, assumes that all
parties will adhere to the protocol, but may attempt to infer
additional information from the “view” available to them from
the protocol. To assess the security of a protocol in the
passive behavioral model, one only needs to check that the
protocol correctly computes the function while revealing no
more information than what can be inherently inferred from
the result of the computation.
In our three-party problem setup, Alice has input X , Bob
input Y , and Charlie wants to compute the function f(X,Y ).
In Section II, we define security based on the real versus
ideal model simulation paradigm [5] and develop an equivalent
information-theoretic characterization that generalizes condi-
tions developed for two parties in [6]. In Section III, we present
a simple arithmetic-based protocol for computing Hamming
distance and show that it is unconditionally secure under
both active and passive behavioral models using information-
theoretic conditions. In Section IV, we illustrate the difference
between the notions of security under active and passive
behavioral models through the BGW protocol for computing
the quadratic and Hamming distances [2]. This protocol is
secure under the passive behavioral model but is shown to be
not secure under the active behavioral model.
II. INFORMATION-THEORETIC SECURITY CONDITIONS
We first define security for the active behavioral model, then
state information-theoretic conditions that are equivalent to
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it, and finally present information-theoretic conditions for the
passive behavioral model. For convenience, our development
is suited to the specific case where only Alice and Bob have
inputs and Charlie computes an output. However, one could
also generalize this development to a scenario with all parties
contributing an input and computing an output.
A. Real versus Ideal Model Simulation Paradigm
A protocol Π for three-party computation is a triple of
algorithms (A,B,C) that are intended to be executed by Alice,
Bob, and Charlie, respectively. These algorithms may include
instructions for processing inputs (X for Alice and Y for Bob),
generating local randomness, performing intermediate local
computations, sending messages to and receiving/processing
messages from other parties, and producing local outputs. The
outputs produced by Alice, Bob, and Charlie will be denoted
by U, V , and W , respectively. A protocol Π is the “real model”
for three-party computation (cf. Figure 1(a)).
(a) Real Model (b) Ideal Model
Fig. 1. A protocol is secure if any attack against it in the real model (a) can
be equivalently mounted against the trusted genie in the ideal model (b).
In the “ideal model” for three-party computation, there
is an additional fourth party: a trusted genie that facilitates
the computation (cf. Figure 1(b)). An ideal model protocol
ΠI is a triple of algorithms (AI , BI , CI) that have a very
specific structure: Alice’s algorithm AI consists solely of
an independent random functionality that takes as an input
only X and outputs UI and XI , and can be modeled as a
conditional distribution PUI ,XI |X . Likewise, Bob’s algorithm
BI is an independent random functionality that takes as an
input only Y and outputs VI and Y I , and can be modeled
as a conditional distribution PVI ,Y I |Y . The random variables
XI and Y I represent the inputs that Alice and Bob give to
the trusted genie, and UI and VI respectively represent Alice
and Bob’s outputs. The trusted genie receives (XI , Y I) from
Alice and Bob, computes f(XI , Y I) and sends this to Charlie.
If either Alice or Bob refuse to send their input to the trusted
genie or send an invalid input, e.g., inputs not belonging to
the proper alphabets X or Y , then the genie assumes a valid
default input. Charlie’s algorithm CI is a random functionality
that takes f(XI , Y I) as input and produces WI as output, and
can be modeled as a conditional distribution PWI |f(XI ,Y I).
Definition 1 (Honest Ideal Model Protocol): The ideal
model protocol ΠI = (AI , BI , CI) is called “honest” if UI =
VI = ∅, XI = X,Y I = Y,WI = f(XI , Y I) = f(X,Y ).
In our problem, at most one party may actively deviate
from the protocol, and no collusions form between any parties.
This motivates the following definition that captures the active
behavioral model of interest.
Definition 2 (Admissible Deviation): A protocol Π =
(A,B,C) is an admissible deviation of Π = (A,B,C) if at
most one of (A,B,C) differs from (A,B,C).
In the real versus ideal model simulation paradigm, a real
model protocol is considered to be secure if it can be shown
that for every attack against the protocol – captured through
the above notion of an admissible deviation of a protocol –
a statistically equivalent attack can be mounted against the
honest ideal model protocol in the ideal model. The following
definition makes this notion precise.
Definition 3 (Security Against Active Behavior): A three-
party protocol Π = (A,B,C) securely computes f(X,Y )
under the active behavioral model if, for every real model
protocol Π = (A,B,C) that is an admissible deviation of Π
and for any distribution PX,Y on inputs (X,Y ) ∼ PX,Y , there
exists an ideal model protocol ΠI = (AI , BI , CI) that is an
admissible deviation of the honest ideal model protocol ΠI ,
where the same players are honest, such that
PU,V,W |X,Y = PUI ,VI ,WI |X,Y , (1)
where (U, V,W ) are the outputs of the protocol Π in the real
model with inputs (X,Y ) and (UI , VI ,WI) are the outputs of
the protocol ΠI in the ideal model with inputs (X,Y ).
Contained within the above definition of security is the
requirement that a secure protocol must ensure that Charlie
will correctly compute the function if none of the parties
deviate from the protocol. This is because no deviation is
an admissible deviation and corresponds to the honest ideal
model protocol which results in correct computation of the
function. Privacy requirements against a deviating party are
also contained within this security definition since the deviat-
ing party may include arbitrary additional information in its
output. The above security definition precludes this additional
output information from containing any information that could
not be obtained by the party deviating in the ideal model.
This definition provides perfect security, however one could
weaken the definition with the equality of (1) replaced by an
“-closeness” requirement, as done in [7] for two parties.
B. Security Conditions for the Active Behavioral Model
The following theorem describes information-theoretic con-
ditions that are equivalent to the security conditions given
by Definition 3. These conditions provide an alternative way
to test whether a given protocol is secure under the active
behavioral model directly in the real model without explicit
reference to an ideal model or a trusted genie. In contrast,
Definition 3 needs to refer to an ideal model.
Theorem 1: A real-model three-party protocol Π =
(A,B,C) securely computes f(X,Y ) under the active be-
havioral model if, and only if, for every real model protocol
Π = (A,B,C) that is an admissible deviation of Π, and
for any distribution PX,Y on inputs (X,Y ) the algorithms
(A,B,C) respectively produce outputs (U, V,W ), such that
the following conditions are satisfied:
• (Correctness) If Π = Π, then
Pr[(U, V,W ) = (∅, ∅, f(X,Y ))] = 1. (2)
• (Security against Alice) If (B,C) = (B,C), then ∃ X :
I(U,X;Y |X) = 0, (3)
Pr[(V,W ) = (∅, f(X,Y ))] = 1. (4)
• (Security against Bob) If (A,C) = (A,C), then ∃ Y :
I(V, Y ;X|Y ) = 0, (5)
Pr[(U,W ) = (∅, f(X,Y ))] = 1. (6)
• (Security against Charlie) If (A,B) = (A,B) then
I(W ;X,Y |f(X,Y )) = 0, (7)
Pr[(U, V ) = (∅, ∅)] = 1. (8)
Proof: In order to prove the equivalence of the
information-theoretic conditions with respect to the ideal vs
real model definition, we must show that the conditions are
both necessary and sufficient.
(Necessity) First, we show that the conditions are necessary,
that is, if the protocol Π securely computes f(X,Y ) then
the information-theoretic conditions must hold. Consider any
real model protocol Π = (A,B,C) that is an admissible
deviation of Π. Since the protocol is secure, there must
exist an ideal model protocol ΠI = (AI , BI , CI) that is
an admissible deviation of the honest ideal model protocol
ΠI = (AI , BI , CI), where the same players are honest, such
that
PU,V,W |X,Y = PUI ,VI ,WI |X,Y ,
where (U, V,W ) are the outputs of the protocol Π in the real
model with inputs (X,Y ) and (UI , VI ,WI) are the outputs of
the protocol ΠI in the ideal model with inputs (X,Y ).
In the case that all of the players are honest, that is Π = Π,
then the corresponding ideal model protocol ΠI is the same
as ΠI , and thus the ideal model outputs UI and VI are null
and WI = f(X,Y ) with probability one. Since PU,V,W |X,Y =
PUI ,VI ,WI |X,Y , we have that
Pr[(U, V,W ) = (∅, ∅, f(X,Y ))] = 1.
Now we consider the case that Alice is dishonest and Bob
and Charlie are honest. In the ideal model, we have that
I(UI , XI ;Y |X) = 0,
since UI and XI are generated only from X , and also by
the structure of the ideal model and the honesty of Bob and
Charlie,
Pr[WI = f(XI , Y )] = 1,
while VI is null. Since PU,V,W |X,Y = PUI ,VI ,WI |X,Y , we
have that V is identically distributed as VI and hence is also
null, and we can define random variable X that is distributed
according to
PX|X,Y,U,V,W := PXI |X,Y,UI ,VI ,WI ,
such that
I(U,X;Y |X) = 0,
and
Pr[W = f(X,Y )] = 1.
The argument for the case that Bob is dishonest is symmet-
ric to the case of a dishonest Alice. This leaves the case for
the when Charlie is dishonest. In the ideal model, Charlie’s
output satisfies
I(WI ;X,Y |f(X,Y )) = 0,
since WI is only generated from f(XI , YI), and that
(XI , YI) = (X,Y ), since Alice and Bob are honest. Also,
since Alice and Bob are honest, their outputs UI and VI are
null. Since PU,V,W |X,Y = PUI ,VI ,WI |X,Y , we must also have
that
I(W ;X,Y |f(X,Y )) = 0,
Pr[(U, V ) = (∅, ∅)] = 1.
(Sufficiency) Now, we must show that the conditions are
sufficient, that is, if the information-theoretic conditions hold
then the protocol is secure. Consider any real model protocol
Π = (A,B,C) that is an admissible deviation of Π and
assume that the information theoretic conditions hold. We must
now construct an ideal model protocol ΠI = (AI , BI , CI) that
is an admissible deviation of the honest ideal model protocol
ΠI = (AI , BI , CI), where the same players are honest, such
that
PU,V,W |X,Y = PUI ,VI ,WI |X,Y ,
where (U, V,W ) are the outputs of the protocol Π in the real
model with inputs (X,Y ) and (UI , VI ,WI) are the outputs of
the protocol ΠI in the ideal model with inputs (X,Y ).
In the case that all of the players are honest, the information
theoretic conditions state that U and V are null and that W =
f(X,Y ) with probability one. The honest ideal model protocol
also produces null outputs for Alice and Bob, that is UI and
VI are null, and Charlie’s output WI = f(X,Y ). Thus, we
have that
PU,V,W |X,Y = PUI ,VI ,WI |X,Y .
In the case that Alice is dishonest, we must construct
an ideal model protocol, with an honest Bob and Charlie,
that produce statistically equivalent outputs. Let Alice’s ideal
model algorithm AI be defined by the conditional distribution
PUI ,XI |X := PU,X|X ,
which governs how Alice generates UI and XI based on only
X . Since Bob and Charlie are honest, that is BI = BI and
CI = CI , with probability one their outputs are given by
VI = ∅ and WI = f(XI , Y ).
Considering the conditional distribution of UI and WI given
X and Y , we have that
PUI ,WI |X,Y =
∑
x
PUI ,WI ,XI |X,Y
=
∑
x
PUI ,XI |X,Y PWI |X,Y,UI ,XI
=
∑
x
PUI ,XI |XPWI |Y,XI ,
since UI and XI are only generated from X and WI =
f(XI , Y ), and hence
PWI |Y,XI (w|y, x) = 1{f(x,y)}(w) =
{
1, if w = f(x, y),
0, otherwise.
(9)
Likewise, we can manipulate the conditional distribution of U
and W given X and Y , using the conditions given by (3) and
(4),
PU,W |X,Y =
∑
x
PU,W,X|X,Y
=
∑
x
PU,X|X,Y PW |X,Y,U,X
=
∑
x
PU,X|XPW |Y,X .
Since PUI ,XI |X = PU,X|X by design and PW |Y,X =
PWI |Y,XI due to (4) and (9), we have that PU,W |X,Y =
PUI ,WI |X,Y . Since both VI and V are null, we have that
PU,V,W |X,Y = PUI ,VI ,WI |X,Y .
The argument for the case that Bob is dishonest is symmet-
ric to the case of a dishonest Alice. This leaves the case for the
when Charlie is dishonest. Let Charlie’s ideal model algorithm
CI be defined by the following conditional distribution that
governs how Charlie generates WI based on only f(XI , Y I)
PWI |f(XI ,Y I) := PW |f(X,Y ) = PW |f(X,Y ),X,Y ,
due to the (8). Note that since Alice and Bob are honest,
(XI , Y I) = (X,Y ), and UI and VI are null. Considering the
conditional distribution of WI given X,Y ,
PWI |X,Y =
∑
f
PWI ,f(XI ,Y I)|X,Y
=
∑
f
PWI |f(XI ,Y I),X,Y Pf(XI ,Y I)|X,Y
=
∑
f
PWI |f(XI ,Y I)Pf(X,Y )|X,Y
=
∑
f
PW |f(X,Y ),X,Y Pf(X,Y )|X,Y
=
∑
f
PW,f(X,Y )|X,Y = PW |X,Y .
Thus since PW |X,Y = PWI |X,Y and both (U, V ) and (UI , VI)
are null, we have that PU,V,W |X,Y = PUI ,VI ,WI |X,Y .
C. Security Conditions for the Passive Behavioral Model
In the passive behavioral model, all parties correctly follow
the protocol, but may still attempt to learn as much new
information as they can from the messages that they receive
from other parties during the execution of the protocol. A
protocol is secure against passive behavior if it produces
correct computation results and reveals no more information
to any party than what can be inherently inferred from their
own input or computation result. Thus, security against passive
behavior is a statement about the correctness and the informa-
tion leakage properties of a protocol. We directly state the
information-theoretic conditions for security under the passive
behavioral model, which one can similarly derive from a real
versus ideal model definition.
Definition 4 (Security Against Passive Behavior): A three-
party protocol Π = (A,B,C) securely computes f(X,Y )
under the passive behavioral model (with no collusions) if after
Alice, Bob, and Charlie execute the protocol, the following
conditions are satisfied:
• (Correctness) Pr[(U, V,W ) = (∅, ∅, f(X,Y ))] = 1.
• (Privacy against Alice) I(M1;Y, f(X,Y )|X) = 0, where
M1 denotes the “view” of Alice, consisting of all the local
randomness generated, local computations performed,
and messages sent and received by Alice.
• (Privacy against Bob) I(M2;X, f(X,Y )|Y ) = 0, where
M2 denotes the view of Bob.
• (Privacy against Charlie) I(M3;X,Y |f(X,Y )) = 0,
where M3 denotes the view of Charlie.
In general, security of a protocol under the active behavioral
model does not necessarily imply security of a protocol under
the passive behavioral model [8]. This may seem counterintu-
itive at first since possible attacks by active parties are surely
expected to subsume the possible “passive attacks”. This can
be resolved by observing that the definition of security under
the active behavioral model compares admissible deviations
(active attacks) in the real model to possible active attacks in
the ideal model. This comparison to a benchmark involving
active attacks in the ideal model potentially results in more
permissive privacy conditions than the information leakage
conditions required in the passive behavioral model. To illus-
trate this difference, consider the following two-party example
(from [8]): Alice and Bob each have a bit and Bob wishes to
compute the Boolean AND of the bits, while Alice computes
nothing. A protocol where Alice simply gives Bob her bit and
he computes his desired function is clearly insecure under the
passive behavioral model since Alice directly reveals her bit,
whereas the AND function should only reveal her bit if Bob’s
bit is one. However, this protocol would be secure in the active
behavioral model since a deviating Bob could change his input
to one to always reveal the value of Alice’s bit from the trusted
genie in the ideal model.
III. A SECURE PROTOCOL FOR HAMMING DISTANCE
We now present and analyze a simple finite-field arithmetic-
based protocol HamDist that securely computes the Hamming
distance for finite-field sequences under both passive and
active behavioral models. The security of this protocol will be
proved using the information-theoretic conditions for security
under (i) the active behavioral model (Theorem 1) and (ii) the
passive behavioral model (Definition 4). We assume that Alice
and Bob have finite-field sequences X := Xn and Y := Y n,
respectively, with Xn, Y n ∈ Fnpk , where Fpk is the finite-
field of prime-power order pk. Charlie wishes to compute the
Hamming distance f(Xn, Y n) :=
∑n
i=1 1{Xi}(Yi).
Protocol HamDist proceeds as follows:
1) Alice randomly chooses two independent sequences
Rn, Zn ∈ Fnpk , where Rn is uniform over all sequences
and Zn is uniform over (Fpk \ {0})n. Alice also ran-
domly chooses a permutation pi of {1, . . . , n}, uniformly
and independently of (Xn, Y n, Rn, Zn).
2) Alice sends Rn, Zn and pi to Bob.
3) Alice sends An := pi(Zn⊗(Xn	Rn)) to Charlie, where
	 and ⊗ respectively denote element-wise field sub-
traction and multiplication, and pi(·) denotes sequence
permutation via pi.
4) Bob sends Bn := pi(Zn ⊗ (Rn 	 Y n)) to Charlie.
5) Charlie combines the messages from Alice and Bob, via
element-wise field addition, and outputs the Hamming
weight of the sequence (An ⊕Bn).
During the execution of the protocol, if any party fails to
send a message or sends an invalid message to another party, a
valid default message is assumed by the receiving party. Also,
any extraneous messages are simply ignored. For example, in
step two, Bob expects to receive two sequences and a per-
mutation from Alice. If Alice omits or sends invalid messages
(e.g., Rn or Zn are not finite-field sequences of the appropriate
length, Zn contains a zero, pi is not a valid permutation), Bob
would interpret an invalid or missing sequence as, for instance,
an all-one sequence, and an invalid or missing permutation as
the identity permutation. The specific default message assumed
in the case of invalid or missing messages is unimportant and
could be replaced by any other valid fixed message.
Before we prove that the HamDist protocol is secure in the
active behavioral model, we first establish two lemmas that
will be used in the proof.
Lemma 1: For random variables A,B,X, Y , the Markov
chain A−B− (X,Y ) holds if and only if the Markov chains
A−B−X and A− (B,X)−Y (or by symmetry A−B−Y
and A− (B, Y )−X) both hold.
Proof: The lemma follows from following identity
I(A;X,Y |B) = I(A;X|B) + I(A;Y |B,X),
since the conditional mutual information on the left hand side
is equal to zero if and only if the Markov chain A−B−(X,Y )
holds, and the conditional mutual informations on the right
hand side are equal to zero if and only if the Markov chains
A−B −X and A− (B,X)− Y both hold.
Lemma 2: If the random variables A,B,X, Y satisfy the
Markov chains A−B−X and A−(B,X)−Y , then A−B−Y
also forms a Markov chain.
Proof: The given Markov chains imply, by Lemma 1, that
A − B − (X,Y ) forms a Markov chain, which also implies,
by symmetry, that A−B − Y forms a Markov chain.
Theorem 2: Protocol HamDist is secure under the active
behavioral model.
Proof: (Correctness) When all parties follow the protocol,
Charlie computes An⊕Bn = pi(Zn⊗ (Xn	Y n)) which has
Hamming weight equal to the Hamming distance between Xn
and Y n, since, for each i, Zi(Xi−Yi) will be non-zero if and
only Xi = Yi. Hence,
Pr[W = f(Xn, Y n)] = 1.
Also, Alice and Bob produce null outputs as specified by the
protocol.
Since any invalid or missing messages are interpreted by
the receiver as some default message, we can assume, without
loss of generality, that the arbitrarily modified algorithms send
well-formed messages belonging to the prescribed message
alphabets.
(Security against Alice) Let R
n ∈ Fnpk denote the sequence
(corresponding to Rn), Z
n ∈ (Fpk \ {0})n denote the
sequence (corresponding to Zn), and pi ∈ P({1, . . . , n})
denote the permutation that Alice sends to Bob. Let A
n ∈ Fnpk
denote the sequence that Alice sends to Charlie. Let X
n
=
R
n ⊕ (pi−1(An)  Zn), where pi−1(·) denotes the inverse
application of the permutation pi, and  denotes element-wise
field division.
Since Alice does not receive any messages, R
n
, Z
n
, A
n
,
pi, and U can only be generated from Xn and since X
n
is
a function of R
n
, Z
n
, A
n
, and pi, we have that Y n −Xn −
(R
n
, Z
n
, A
n
, pi, U)− (Xn, U) forms a Markov chain, hence
I(U,X
n
;Y n|Xn) = 0.
Since Bob and Charlie are following the protocol, the
messages from Alice and Bob’s input Y n are ultimately
combined by Charlie to form the vector
A
n ⊕Bn = pi(Zn ⊗ (Xn 	Rn))⊕ pi(Zn ⊗ (Rn 	 Y n))
= pi(Z
n ⊗ (Xn 	 Y n))
from which he computes the Hamming weight to produce the
output W = f(X
n
, Y n). Bob, following the protocol, does
not produce an output, hence V is null.
(Security against Bob) Bob receives the random sequences
(Rn, Zn) and random permutation pi from Alice. Let B
n ∈
Fnpk denote the sequence that Bob sends to Charlie. Let Y
n
=
Rn 	 (pi−1(Bn) Zn).
The message B
n
can only be generated from Rn, Zn, pi,
and Y n, thus B
n − (Rn, Zn, pi, Y n) − Xn forms a Markov
chain. Since (Rn, Zn, pi) is independent of (Xn, Y n), we
have that (Rn, Zn, pi) − Y n − Xn trivially forms a Markov
chain. These two Markov chains imply that (B
n
, Rn, Znpi)−
Y n − Xn forms a Markov chain by Lemma 1. Since Y n
is a function of (B
n
, Rn, Zn, pi) and V can only be gen-
erated from Y n, Rn, Zn, pi, B
n
, and Y
n
, we have that
(V, Y
n
)− (Bn, Rn, Zn, pi, Y n)− Y n −Xn forms a Markov
chain, hence
I(V, Y
n
;Xn|Y n) = 0.
Since Alice and Charlie are following the protocol, the mes-
sage from Bob and Alice’s input Xn are ultimately combined
by Charlie to form the vector
An ⊕Bn = pi(Zn ⊗ (Xn 	Rn))⊕ pi(Zn ⊗ (Rn 	 Y n))
= pi(Zn ⊗ (Xn 	 Y n))
from which he computes the Hamming weight to produce the
output W = f(Xn, Y
n
). Alice, following the protocol, does
not produce an output, hence U is null.
(Security against Charlie) Charlie receives An from Alice
and Bn from Bob. Charlie’s output W can only be generated
from An and Bn thus W − (An, Bn) − (Xn, Y n) forms a
Markov chain. Since f(Xn, Y n) is a function of An and Bn,
we have that
(Xn, Y n)− (An, Bn, f(Xn, Y n))−W (10)
also forms a Markov chain. Further, the Markov chain
(Xn, Y n)− f(Xn, Y n)− (An, Bn) (11)
holds due to the following,
I(An, Bn;Xn, Y n|f(Xn, Y n))
(a)
= I(Bn, An ⊕Bn;Xn, Y n|f(Xn, Y n))
= H(Xn, Y n|f(Xn, Y n))
−H(Xn, Y n|Bn, An ⊕Bn, f(Xn, Y n))
(b)
= H(Xn, Y n|f(Xn, Y n))
−H(Xn, Y n|An ⊕Bn, f(Xn, Y n))
= I(An ⊕Bn;Xn, Y n|f(Xn, Y n))
(c)
= 0,
where (a) holds since An is a function of (Bn, An⊕Bn) and
(An⊕Bn) is a function of (An, Bn), (b) is due to the indepen-
dence and uniformity of Rn, and (c) holds since f(Xn, Y n) is
a sufficient statistic for An⊕Bn = pi(Zn⊗ (Xn	Y n)). The
multiplication of each (Xi−Yi) with Zi results in a uniformly
random value in (Fpk \{0}) that is independent from (Xi, Yi)
when Xi 6= Yi. Thus, the sequence Zn ⊗ (Xn 	 Y n) would
only reveal where Xi and Yi are not equal, and the randomly
permuted sequence pi(Zn ⊗ (Xn 	 Y n)) would only reveal
the number of locations where they are not equal, which is no
more than what would be revealed by the Hamming distance
f(Xn, Y n). By Lemma 2 and the Markov chains in (10)
and (11), we have that (Xn, Y n) − f(Xn, Y n) −W forms
a Markov chain, and hence
I(W ;Xn, Y n|f(Xn, Y n)) = 0.
Also, since Alice and Bob follow the protocol, their outputs,
U and V , are null.
As previously discussed, security of a protocol under the
active behavioral model does not necessarily imply security
of a protocol under the passive behavioral model [8]. We,
however, have the following result.
Theorem 3: Protocol HamDist is secure under the passive
behavioral model.
Proof: (Correctness) The protocol is correct according to
the same argument as for the active behavioral model.
(Privacy against Alice) The protocol is private against Alice
since she does not even receive any messages and hence no
information from other parties. Formally,
I(M1;Y
n, f(Xn, Y n)|Xn)
= I(pi,Rn, Zn, pi(Zn ⊗ (Xn 	Rn));Y n, f(Xn, Y n)|Xn)
= I(pi,Rn, Zn;Y n, f(Xn, Y n)|Xn) = 0,
since pi(Zn ⊗ (Xn 	 Rn)) is a function of (pi,Rn, Zn, Xn),
and (pi,Rn, Zn) are independent of Xn and Y n.
(Privacy against Bob) The protocol is private against Bob
since the only message from Alice that he receives are
independent of Xn, Y n,W . Formally,
I(M2;X
n, f(Xn, Y n)|Y n)
= I(pi,Rn, Zn, pi(Zn ⊗ (Rn 	 Y n));Xn, f(Xn, Y n)|Y n)
= I(pi,Rn, Zn;Xn, f(Xn, Y n)|Y n) = 0,
since pi(Zn ⊗ (Rn 	 Y n)) is a function of (pi,Rn, Zn, Y n),
and (pi,Rn, Zn) are independent of Xn and Y n.
(Privacy against Charlie) The protocol is private against
Charlie since the messages that he receives from Alice and Bob
are only sufficient to reveal pi(Zn⊗(Xn	Y n)), which reveals
no more information about Xn and Y n than the Hamming
distance. Formally,
I(M3;X
n, Y n|f(Xn, Y n))
= I(An, Bn;Xn, Y n|f(Xn, Y n)) = 0,
due to (11).
IV. INADEQUACY OF BGW FOR QUADRATIC DISTANCE
Under the passive behavioral model (with no collusions),
any function can be securely computed amongst three parties
using the secure computation methods of [2] that are based
on homomorphic polynomial secret sharing [9] and is called
the BGW protocol. Since we are dealing with three parties,
the techniques proposed in [2] for active adversaries, which
require a minimum of four parties, are not applicable. We
describe the BGW protocol for three-party quadratic and Ham-
ming distance computation and show that it is insecure under
the active behavioral model. The question as to whether there
exist protocols that securely compute the quadratic distance
under the active behavioral model remains open.
We assume that Alice and Bob respectively have integer
sequences Xn, Y n ∈ Zns , where Zs := {0, 1, . . . , s − 1}. We
embed the set Zs in a finite-field ZN of prime order N > n(s−
1)2 with modulo-N field arithmetic. This ensures that ZN is
large enough to simulate the necessary integer arithmetic for
computing the quadratic distance f(Xn, Y n) =
∑n
i=1(Xi −
Yi)
2 while avoiding overflow (modulo) effects. Protocol BGW
for computing the quadratic distance proceeds as follows:
1) Alice randomly chooses α1, . . . , αn ∼ iid Unif(ZN )
independently of (Xn, Y n). For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
Alice creates a polynomial pi : ZN → ZN , via pi(j) :=
αij + Xi. Alice sends Bob (party j = 2) the values
(p1(2), . . . , pn(2)), and Charlie (party j = 3) the values
(p1(3), . . . , pn(3)), while retaining (p1(1), . . . , pn(1))
for herself (party j = 1).
2) Similarly, Bob randomly chooses β1, . . . , βn ∼
iid Unif(ZN ) independently of (Xn, Y n), and creates
polynomials qi(j) := βij + Yi. Bob sends Alice
the values (q1(1), . . . , qn(1)), and Charlie the values
(q1(3), . . . , qn(3)), while retaining (q1(2), . . . , qn(2)).
3) Alice, Bob, and Charlie each individually compute sam-
ples of the polynomial r : ZN → ZN defined by r(j) :=∑n
i=1
[
p2i (j) + q
2
i (j)− 2pi(j)qi(j)
]
. Specifically, Alice
computes r(1) using {pi(1), qi(1)}ni=1. Likewise, Bob
and Charlie compute r(2) and r(3), respectively.
4) Alice and Bob send r(1) and r(2), respectively, to
Charlie.
5) Charlie reconstructs the degree-2 polynomial r via inter-
polation from r(1), r(2), and r(3). Finally, he obtains:
r(0) =
n∑
i=1
[
p2i (0) + q
2
i (0)− 2pi(0)qi(0)
]
=
n∑
i=1
[
X2i + Y
2
i − 2XiYi
]
= f(Xn, Y n).
Since quadratic distance coincides with Hamming distance
for binary sequences (s = 2), the above protocol can also be
used to compute the Hamming distance for binary sequences.
Proposition 1: For quadratic and Hamming distance com-
putation, the BGW protocol is secure under the passive
behavioral model, but not under the active behavioral model.
Proof: The security of this protocol under the passive
behavioral model is well-known (see [10] for a rigorous
proof) and one can confirm that it satisfies the conditions of
Definition 4. To show insecurity under the active behavioral
model, it is sufficient to describe an attack that is able
to influence the computation beyond what can be achieved
against a trusted genie. For this, we demonstrate examples for
both the quadratic and Hamming distance below.
Quadratic Distance (s > 2): The range R(f) of the quadratic
distance, is a proper subset of Zn(s−1)2 since each function
value is a sum of n numbers from the set {x2 : x ∈ Zs}.
The finite-field ZN must have prime size N > n(s − 1)2 in
order to simulate integer arithmetic as finite-field arithmetic.
Hence, R(f) ( ZN , whereas ZN \ R(f) contains invalid
outputs for the function computation. In the ideal model, for
any attack by Alice (or symmetrically by Bob), the output
of Charlie would still remain in R(f), since Alice can only
affect it by changing her input. However, in the real model,
Alice can launch a simple attack, where she randomly chooses
the final message r(1) sent to Charlie independently and
uniformly over ZN . This causes Charlie’s output to uniformly
take values over ZN , including invalid values, due to the
polynomial interpolation in computing his output. For fixed
r(2) and r(3), each modified value of r(1) corresponds to a
unique interpolation result, since 3 samples uniquely determine
a degree-2 polynomial. Due to this one-to-one relationship, a
uniform distribution on r(1) induces a uniform distribution on
the computation result. Thus, the protocol is insecure as there
exists an attack in the real model (against the protocol) that
cannot be equivalently mounted in the ideal model. In addition
to creating the possibility of an invalid output, the attack also
makes the distribution of valid outputs uniform, which cannot
occur in an attack against a trusted genie.
Hamming Distance (s = 2): Suppose that Alice and Bob
have independent sequences of iid Bernoulli(1/2) bits. In the
ideal model, for any attack by Alice (or symmetrically by
Bob), the exclusive-OR of her string and Bob’s is an iid
Bernoulli(1/2) sequence since his string is iid Bernoulli(1/2)
and independent of Alice’s modified input. This means that
for any attack by Alice against a trusted genie, Charlie’s
output is always distributed over {0, 1, . . . , n} as a binomial
distribution with mean n/2. For the protocol in the real model,
if N = n+1 is prime, then ZN can be used without containing
any invalid outputs. However, Alice could launch a simple
attack by randomly choosing the final message r(1) sent to
Charlie uniformly over ZN , causing Charlie’s output to be
uniformly distributed over {0, 1, . . . , n}. Thus, the protocol is
insecure since there exists an attack in the real model that
influences the output in a manner that cannot be replicated by
an attack against a trusted genie.
REFERENCES
[1] R. Cramer and I. Damga˚rd, “Multiparty computation, an introduction,”
in Contemporary Cryptology, ser. Advanced Courses in Mathematics –
CRM Barcelona. Birkha¨user Basel, 2005, pp. 41–87.
[2] M. Ben-Or, S. Goldwasser, and A. Wigderson, “Completeness theorems
for non-cryptographic fault-tolerant distributed computation,” in Pro-
ceedings of the ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, Chicago, IL,
1988, pp. 1–10.
[3] D. Chaum, C. Cre´peau, and I. Damga˚rd, “Multi-party unconditionally
secure protocols,” in Proceedings of the ACM Symposium on Theory of
Computing, Chicago, IL, 1988, pp. 11–19.
[4] M. Pease, R. Shostak, and L. Lamport, “Reaching agreement in the
presence of faults,” Journal of the ACM, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 228–234,
Apr. 1980.
[5] O. Goldreich, Foundations of Cryptography. Cambridge University
Press, 2004, vol. II: Basic Applications.
[6] C. Cre´peau, G. Savvides, C. Schaffner, and J. Wullschleger,
“Information-theoretic conditions for two-party secure function evalu-
ation,” in Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT, ser. Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, vol. 4004. Springer-Verlag, 2006, pp. 538–554.
[7] C. Cre´peau and J. Wullschleger, “Statistical security conditions for two-
party secure function evaluation,” in Proceedings of the 3rd International
Conference on Information Theoretic Security, ser. Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, vol. 5155. Springer-Verlag, 2008, pp. 86–99.
[8] J. Wullschleger, “Oblivious-transfer amplification,” Ph.D. dissertation,
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zu¨rich, 2008.
[9] A. Shamir, “How to share a secret,” Communications of the ACM,
vol. 22, no. 11, pp. 637–647, 1985.
[10] G. Asharov and Y. Lindell, “A full proof of the BGW protocol for
perfectly-secure multiparty computation,” Cryptology ePrint Archive,
2011, http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/136.
